TAC ATTACK

FEBRUARY 1988

ANGLE OF ATTACK

It's early January as I sit here jotting down a few rambling thoughts to share with you--welcome back (even though you'll read this in February). By the time this issue of *TAC Attack* finds its way into your hands, you'll have had time to get into the swing of things for 1988.

February is a great month to pull out the summaries of past Safety Days and review the lessons recorded there. Take a look around at your unit's operations; whether you fly jets, maintain them or work in support areas such as supply, fire protection, administration or security police. Are we putting those Safety Day insights to use or are we still using F-100/F-4 era mentality in our F-15/F-16 units? Are we doing things because they make sense or just because we've always done them a certain way for a long time?

How do you expect your unit to fare this year in the ground safety area? Our studies on folks who've had mishaps in the past show that the next person who will be involved in an off-duty mishap will probably be between 18 and 22 with either alcohol, excessive speed or non-use of seat belts involved as a factor in the mishap. Are you, as a role model, projecting the proper image for your young folks? We know that *the individual* can't survive in the flying business. The very same things applies on the ground. It takes the team to survive and succeed.

We need to make sure that our people understand that the guy who "does his own thing" doesn't allow it to get in the way of the team effort. Sometimes people get confused with the responsibilities of the team player. A football player like Jim McMahon, for example, isn't recognized solely for what *he* does. He does his own thing *only* as long as it supports the team's efforts. Each of us on the TAC team needs to keep that uppermost in our daily priorities.

Don't let February weather catch you with your guard down. You may experience a day or two of good weather but don't forget that it's still wintertime out there. Don't let your eagerness for springtime cause you to overlook today's opponent while you're waiting for the nice weather that lies somewhere down the road yet.

Several of our recent flight mishaps have occurred in jets equipped with video recorders. We're compiling a tape of those incidents to send to all TAC units for your information and use.

Finally, a kudo to Captain Robert McCutchen of the 363d Tactical Fighter Wing at Shaw for an outstanding aircraft save after he experienced a birdstrike in his F-16C. You'll read about him next month in our March Aircrew of Distinction.

Happy Ground-Hog Day, Pardner.

Jack Gawelko

JACK GAWELKO, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Safety

TAC ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

18

4

10

features

departments

TACSP 127-1

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

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FLIGHT

Colonel Jay Callaway
Commander, 363 TFW
Shaw AFB, SC

a balancing act

"Fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted to them in any way they like, and when they spot an enemy, they attack and shoot him down . . . anything else is rubbish!"

This has been a basic premise in fighter aviation since Baron von Richthofen made the statement during World War I. To be successful, an individual must be both competitive and aggressive – two critical elements in the makeup of any fighter pilot's personality. These are absolute requirements in the business of flying fighters.

A few years ago when I attended the Canadian Defence College, I had an opportunity to travel around the world. Throughout the Pacific, Middle East and Europe as well as North and South America, one impression of Americans continued to stand out. That was that Americans, on the whole, possess an

LEADERSHIP



aggressive and competitive spirit. Just as these traits are found throughout our society, they are also the cornerstones of fighter aviation that are absolutely necessary for survival in combat and for mission success.

I have been fortunate to wear a flight suit and see this attitude firsthand from the days of Vietnam until now. Whether flying combat missions in PACAF, or peacetime training sorties in TAC or USAFE, I have flown with the kind of aggressive and competitive fighter pilots and weapon systems officers (WSOs) that provide the TAF with its combat capability. The essential leadership necessary to shape, mold and direct our fighter crews comes not only from the individual's flight commander up through his wing commander, but also from his flight leader in the air. It is the flight lead who sets the tone that allows the necessary aggressive and competitive spirit to exist while still structuring the mission to ensure the capabilities of the least experienced flight member are not exceeded.

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FLIGHT LEADERSHIP

Each member of the flight has a different experience level and capabilities, so the mission must be balanced accordingly.

Both the flight commander and flight lead must ensure that established standards are always met by enforcing discipline. In other subjective areas, however, they must not be overly critical or demanding when an inexperienced wingman fails to meet their personal expectations. The flight lead must be sensitive to the capabilities of each individual flight member and not slip into a style of leadership based on the use of fear, sarcasm, or ridicule. He must realize that an inexperienced wingman's judgment may break down from too much pressure or an overdesire to succeed. When something out of the ordinary or inappropriate occurs during a critical phase of flight, a "knock-it-off" call followed by directive commentary is required from the flight lead to ensure that the expected flow of the mission is restored and the desired mission objectives achieved.

The flight lead must be sensitive to the capabilities of each individual flight member and not slip into a style of leadership based on the use of fear, sarcasm, or ridicule.

Planned mission objectives must be based on a realistic consideration of the abilities of all flight members. Flight leads must be careful that in their own competitive nature, they do not task a wingman beyond his capabilities. Remember, his competitive nature will drive him to attempt to meet your expectations – even if it's beyond his own level of experience. Set high standards and demand compliance, but use judgment concerning the ability of your inexperienced people.

Competitiveness and aggressiveness are integral parts of our American way of life. When those qualities in our fighter crews are combined with the leadership of a disciplined, perceptive flight lead, the result is combat capability – the reason we fly fighters. Balancing these variables is your responsibility as a flight lead. Your experience, judgment, aggressiveness and competitiveness are some of the reasons you were selected for your job. Bringing all of these elements together in the air is your challenge; balancing the aggressive spirit and the abilities of your wingmen is what it's all about.

AIRCREW OF DISTINCTION



1Lt John D. Ramsey **Capt Jack J. Akenson**
336 TFS, 4 TFW
Seymour Johnson AFB, NC

First Lieutenant John D. Ramsey, aircraft commander, and Captain Jack J. Akenson, weapon systems officer, were flying the lead F-4E of a two-ship air-to-ground low-level mission over mountainous terrain. The initial portion of their flight went as planned, with the external fuel tank feeding out normally. On the fourth leg of the low-level, however, Lt Ramsey noticed an abnormal fuel reading of 4.9 tape (useable fuselage, cells 1-6) over 8.0 counter (total useable internal fuel). Both crewmen immediately recognized the limited fuel available to them, aborted the mission and began to climb.

Suspecting trapped internal wing fuel, the aircrew accomplished the appropriate emergency procedures for fuel transfer failure, but these actions did not solve the problem. With their fuel state at 3.5 tape over 7.2 counter, the crew continued their climb in order to conserve fuel while determining the most suitable emergency airfield for landing.

Their primary alternates, both nearly 100 miles away, were rejected since they now had only 2500 pounds of useable fuel remaining. Capt Akenson located two other nearby airfields: one within 30 nautical miles, but with only 5,700 feet of runway available; and the other was 30 miles away, but with 6,800 feet available.

The crew completed a minimum fuel descent to the longer runway and, coping with extremely hazy weather, finally picked the runway up at 1.5 miles. At that time, the approach control told the crew that the runway had no overruns and dropped off into a gorge at the departure end. The crew planned to touch down as near as possible to the approach end of the runway and utilize maximum braking. They also coordinated a plan to eject if they were unable to stop the aircraft on the runway. Upon landing, Lt Ramsey immediately deployed the drag chute and brought the aircraft to a safe stop with about 300 feet of runway remaining.

The superior airmanship, timely decision-making and smooth crew coordination demonstrated by Lt Ramsey and Capt Akenson saved a valuable combat aircraft and earned for them the TAC Aircrew of Distinction Award.



TAC tips

tac tips

INTERESTING ITEMS, TAC

Lookout below, and above, and to the side

After individual takeoffs ten seconds apart, the F-4 flight lead was in a sweeping right-hand climbing turn while number two was closing to the inside of the turn. When number two was about 1,000 feet out, a small, white Cessna flew between the aircraft passing just below the leader and just above the wingman. The F-4 crews estimated the miss distance at 100 feet. The Cessna pilot later called the tower and apologized for accidently stumbling into the airport traffic area.

On another day at a different air base, a single F-4 pulled up for a closed pattern and configured the aircraft for a normal landing. Just before beginning the base turn, the crew looked up and saw a small white Cherokee in their path. The Phantom pushed the nose over and passed about 200 feet below and in front of the smaller aircraft.



We stress the importance of an aggressive lookout doctrine in tactical formation because it will help improve our chances for mission success and survival in the tactical realm. That doesn't mean we can let our guard down in the local area. It won't matter who was in the wrong if you're dead. Neither IFR service nor the familiarity of your own traffic pattern guarantee separation from VFR traffic. Your Mark-1 eyeballs are still your best bogey proximity warning system.

How's your lookout?

The trouble with towers

Some weapons types consider using towers for low-level turn points (or other checkpoints directly beneath the planned flight path) tactically unsound for a couple of reasons. First, in bad-guy country, if a tower supports critical communications, it's liable to be defended. Second, because of its value, some enterprising targeteer may select it for interdiction; so it may not still be standing when you're screaming by at treetop level looking for your turn point. If we're really training the way we're going to fight, we'd avoid overflying towers.

But let's face it. There are times when the schedule changes, and we need a map in a hurry – one that gets us from A to B without a tour of somebody's control zone . . .

A pair of A-10s was flying a low altitude tactical navigation route to the range. One of the preplanned turn points that the flight lead had chosen during his mission planning was a 31-foot tower. Normally, that's not a real hazard on a planned 500-foot LATN mission. It became one on this mission because he didn't see it. About a minute out, he was no-joy, so he went heads-down to reprogram the turn point coordinates into his

MISHAPS WITH MORALS, FOR THE AIRCREWMAN

inertial navigation set.

If you're cruising in a Warthog at 500 feet and look down for awhile, guess what may happen to your altitude? Wasn't long before the tower was higher than he was. Unfortunately, the wingman had also been distracted and had his eyes in the cockpit for about 15 seconds taking care of a recurring Master Caution light by turning off his transponder's mode IV.

Both pilots looked up as the leader clipped one of the guy wires several feet below the top of the tower.

Can you think of a technique that may have prevented the $7,000 plastic surgery job on the flight lead's Warthog? Suppose the flight lead told his wingman that he was going to be headsdown for a few seconds. And suppose before the call he climbed up a few hundred feet.

A shocking trip

An F-111 crew was entering an IR route at 10,000 feet MSL when they saw two bright glows of light come from under the radome followed by two audible bumps. They didn't notice any problems inside the aircraft, but they immediately aborted the mission and went home.

The crew had been flying in instrument conditions with rime icing occurring between 8000 and 10,000 feet when the incident occurred. The freezing level had been forecast at 7000 feet. Examination of the jet revealed damage to the radome and both UHF antennas as a result of the static discharge.

During the preflight weather briefing, note the freezing level. Static discharge and lightning strike are most likely to occur within 10,000 feet of this altitude. Avoid prolonged flight at or near the freezing level and prevent an electrifying experience.

PUT OUT THE

Janet Gaines
TAC Attack

"Put out the fire!"

Those dreaded words could be said by any one of us. Why? It's simple. When necessary day-to-day safety measures are not used in the workplace or around the home, you or I might find ourselves shouting just such unexpected phrases in reaction to what happens. A recent house fire near me sharpened my awareness to the fact that it only takes *one* fire, *one* accident or *one* tragedy to bring to our attention the safety measures we *should* be practicing every day. It is a hard way to be reminded of the reality that we should consider safety in all of our everyday, normal tasks. See if that's not true in your own life. Take a few seconds to notice your daily habits and you may realize that there are a lot of unsafe things you are doing *without even realizing or thinking about them.* As a result, you could be overlooking some potentially dangerous situations that exist around you. Needless to say, something serious like a fire can cause you or me a lot of grief and sorrow in return for our thoughtlessness or carelessness.

FIRE!

How was this fire started? It was mainly due to carelessness; a result of not taking the necessary safety precautions while cooking. Water was dropped from wet hands into a skillet of hot grease, causing the grease to splash onto a stove burner. The resulting flame traveled to the nearby walls, curtains, cabinets and ceiling. It only took a few seconds for the fire to roar out of control and cause extensive damage throughout the house before actions were taken to put it out and the fire department could arrive.

If you think about it, it only takes a few seconds of our time to include those necessary safety measures which could prevent fires. Luckily in this situation, no one was burned and the fire insurance covered the damages incurred. The end result is not always the same.

Many times the result of our unsafe practices depends a lot on our reactions to the mishap that occurs. On this occasion, a next-door neighbor noticed the fire, grabbed a fire extinguisher, and started putting the blaze out after evacuating the person involved. The woman who had caused the fire was found in a state of shock which was why the fire went out of control. Could this be your reaction to a fire? What can you do to prevent that from happening to you? There are several safety measures which are applicable while cooking and some you may want to remember for future reference. First, know the proper procedures for preventing fires and then what you should do to survive one if it happens. Second, always know what to do to put out the different types of fires you might experience. Finally, here are just a few pointers about grease fires to remember:

– Smother the flames with a lid.

– Never pick up the pan because of fanning the blaze.

– Use a fire extinguisher.

– Never throw water on a grease fire.

When you forget to take appropriate safety precautions and least expect it, something like a fire can jolt you back to reality in an instant. Don't let yourself be put in the position of having to think *if only I had taken the safety measures.*



DOWN TO EARTH

ITEMS THAT CAN AFFECT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HERE ON THE GROUND

Seat belts - the tighter, the better

A buckled safety belt is not enough protection during an accident. Belts must be buckled *and* properly adjusted.

During a crash, a person moves forward at the same speed as the car. The shoulder belt keeps the upper body from colliding with the car. And, a tight lap belt holds the driver behind the wheel, helping him control the car.

First, the lap belt must be tight. In many cars, the lap-and-shoulder belt is one continuous strap. The belt slides through a tongue or latch plate at the buckle. Motorists can tighten such a lap belt by pulling up on the shoulder belt just above the buckle.

In some cars, the end of the buckle between the front seats has a plastic cover that keeps the buckle upright. It allows easy buckling, but tends to pull the belt away from the motorist. When the belt is buckled, the plastic cover should follow the contour of the body. If not, the lap belt is too loose.

Many people complained that the early shoulder straps rubbed against the neck or upper body. American automakers designed tension relievers to encourage belt use. They work like a window shade – yank to roll up, pull slowly to lengthen. With this design, the tension reliever slackens the belt every time the motorist leans forward or moves around.

The design makes the person wearing the belt responsible for keeping the belt adjusted tightly, both when buckling and after moving around. It's important to keep the belt tight – accidents always are unexpected.

For best protection, a shoulder belt should have no slack. That is particularly important for short drivers who sit far forward to reach pedals – they can easily collide with the steering wheel during a crash.

While most American cars have tension relievers, new-car buyers will find zero-slack shoulder belts in imported cars. Zero-slack belts always stay tight.

Properly worn safety belts prevent injuries, and help prevent accidents by giving the driver better control. A belt can't be too tight during a crash. Put it on tight, and make sure it stays tight. You're not fully protected unless you do.

– Courtesy, Mr. John Fobian, "Let's Talk Cars," American Automobile Association.



TSgt Mary Rowe
TAC/SEG

We all need a break from our daily routines, both in the workplace and at home, from time to time. That is, to get away from the day-to-day activities and responsibilities that surround each of us. It's healthy to be aware of the job stresses and pressures that are a big part of our everyday activities. But, how well each of us deals with the stress in our lives depends upon *how* we let off steam when we're off duty.

I recall a time last summer when I felt everything was crowding in on me and I badly needed a break. Frustration with work, school and all the other things I felt responsible for had made it obvious that I needed to get away for a while. My husband and I decided to go camping on the weekend "to get away from it all." Looking back, that sounds funny now because the stress I'd felt on the job was nothing compared to what I began to feel as all of my preparations for the camping trip seemed to go wrong.

I picked up the camper in the morning and soon discovered that the lights didn't work properly. When I turned on the right signal light, *all* the lights on that side of the camper and truck flashed and the same would happen on the left side when I used the left signal. It took us about two hours to trace and repair the wiring problem before we finally got on the road late that evening.

Then we discovered that the right front headlight was burned out. By that time, I was fed up and ready to go camping **no matter what went wrong.** My husband, of course, insisted on stopping and fixing the headlight. In my headlong rush to get away for the weekend, I realized that I had been willing to compromise common sense principles just to make the break away from the routine. Now I'm really glad we stopped to ensure everything was right before we continued on our way. You know, the campground was still there when we arrived and the rest of the weekend went very well.

You too will feel the need to blow off steam and leave your normal work responsibilities behind for awhile, especially after such stressful periods as exercises and sortie surges. But, a word of caution from my own experience. After 12-hour shifts for a week, the constant pressure you've worked under may lead you to make unwise compromises in order to "get away from it all." Think twice when you catch yourself being willing to bypass what you know is right just to get to where you are going. No matter what you choose, camping, fishing or even "going out on the town" to get your attitude re-adjusted, the bottom line is — making responsible decisions about what you're going to do, how you're going to go about it and even how you are going to get home afterwards are vital parts of the process. Don't let your eagerness and enthusiasm to "blow off steam" blow up in your face.

CHOCK TALK

INCIDENTS AND

What's a half-inch among friends?

During a night air refueling mission, an RF-4 crew was unable to close the IFR (inflight refueling) door after refueling. They thought the reason might be the popped IFR circuit breaker – but it wouldn't reset. Then, the pilot noticed the fuel gauge was frozen at a reading considerably below what he expected after just refueling. The crew followed the checklist procedure for a broken receptacle actuator and recovered at the home base. But during the descent, one of the outboard tanks partially collapsed.

Troubleshooters found that someone had used an improper screw in the light assembly within the IFR door. The screw that the worker used to hold down the hot wire lead was about a half-inch too long. So whenever the IFR door was opened, the door made contact with the screw and caused an electrical short in the light circuit. The short caused the circuit breaker to pop and also prevented external tank pressurization during the descent.

The screw *almost* fit. But since it wasn't designed to do that *particular* job, it didn't do it as well.

Each of our aircraft are put together with literally thousands of parts. Each part is specifically designed and tested for the functions it must perform. Each one of us who earns his pay working on aircraft can disturb the normal function and operation of a number of aircraft systems – simply by using imagination in substituting parts. Now that we know the potential, let's not let it happen.



Bad air

During a KC-135 preflight, the boom operator noticed that one of the portable oxygen bottles had dropped to 100 psi. He refilled the oxygen bottle using one of the aircraft recharging outlet hoses. As he did so, he noticed a very strong odor of paint thinner or glue in the air that leaked out of the bottle. When all the remaining bottles were checked, three more were found that contained contaminated oxygen.

The contaminant was identified as methyl ethyl ketone (MEK), an agent that had been used to strip away paint from the bottle. During the process the fluid had leaked into the bottles. After the treatment, the bottles were completely repainted and the technician doing the maintenance hadn't realized that there had been a leak. There were no governing tech orders or directives for this type of repair work and no one could determine when the procedure had been started.

INCIDENTALS WITH A MAINTENANCE SLANT

Supervision assumed that the repaint procedures were correct because it had been done that way for so long that nobody even questioned it.

Are you doing anything that you assume is right because *that's the way it's always been done?*

Early duty

An F-4 crew chief's thoughts:
0-dark-thirty. What a way to earn a living. I should be sleeping like everybody else. Oh well, it's better than day shift when it gets so hot you can't think. But I wish the sun was up, at least; I hate using this flashlight.

I can't believe it. Here comes the aircrew already. What time is it? Man, I'm not ready for this. Better get this 780 gear broken down – nothing makes them sore at the Ol' Chief like having to pull their own downlocks and unpin their own ejection seats. At least I got the WSO's seat ready. Guess I'll set this jury strut there on top of the intake and get it later.

"Good morning, Captain. Here are the forms. Three-eight-nine here just got back from the trim pad, and I'm a little behind schedule. But I'll have her ready before you're finished reading. Here's my flashlight for your preflight, Captain."

Now, where was I? Well, I better help strap the backseater in. "Yes, sir, I'll be happy to wipe down the canopies for you." Back down the ladder to get a rag – I wish I had a dollar for every trip I made up and down this thing. OK, everybody's strapped in, and the windows are all clean. Time to go back down and crank this beast. Where's that jury strut? The WSO must have tossed it down to Howard.

"How do you read, sir? Yes, sir, fore and aft areas clear, fire guard posted, and here comes air on two."

We were lucky this time. One way or another the jury strut ended up hanging in front of the intake, dangling from the wire to the safety pin that caught on the vari-ramp. When the Phantom took off, the engine sucked the strut down the intake with such force that it ripped the safety pin wire from the strut. The pin flew up and over the intake and landed in the overrun. The strut sailed into the engine but lodged against the inlet guide vanes where it remained through the flight. The strut only nicked and rubbed the first stage compressor blades, but we're talking close.

The crew chief didn't see the dangling strut because it wasn't where he put it. The pilot didn't see it on his walk-around. And the end-of-runway crew (who didn't have a light-all) didn't see it either. A sudden epidemic of bad eyesight? Not really. But we have discovered a formula for trouble: DARKNESS + HASTE + BROKEN HABIT PATTERNS + ASSUMPTIONS = TROUBLE. Looks like something that supervisors could take an interest in, doesn't it?


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P-47 THUNDERBOLT



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

Lt Col Harley Davidson
TAC Flight Safety

Some months back, I wrote an article for TAC ATTACK (Aug 87) entitled, "The Unrealistic 'Realistic Scenario'." As the title implied, the article concerned realism in our training. This article also deals with realism, but it is not intended to be a rehash of the previous one; rather, it is intended to provide some insight as to the "hows" and "whys" of unrealistic training. In my travels to flying units throughout TAC, I have noticed a certain lack of realism in three key areas: 1) choice of scenarios, 2) threats in the scenario, and 3) the cosmosity of our scenarios.

Choice of Scenario. Realistic training depends first and foremost on having a clear picture of the real world. It is this "real world" picture (or lack thereof) that I want to discuss first. A quick look at the current world political/military situation gives us a good clue as to the potential enemies, locations and threats most likely to be encountered next. But, how many of us on a day-to-day basis actually look at the available intelligence reports, newspapers or TV and then plan our combat scenario around the "real world" situation? Unless I've missed my guess, almost none of us. A hot spot in Latin America or southwest Asia may be ready to explode and many of us will still be concentrating on high threat central Europe or other equally unlikely scenarios. If we are spending a disproportionate share of our

"realism"

time training for the less likely scenarios (and I believe we are), then there must be factors driving us in that direction. With minimal thought, at least three come to mind: 1) comfort, 2) Checkered Flag tasking, and 3) IG inspections.

Comfort (Habit). We tend to accomplish those tasks which we know and do best. Thus, if we primarily learn hi-threat as a wingman, we will probably emphasize and fly hi-threat as a flight lead, instruct it as an IP and evaluate it as a SEFE. It becomes a vicious cycle that can soon spread throughout an entire unit. Like other creatures, we humans have a tendency to follow the path of least resistance; thus, when we feel rushed to prepare for a flight (which seems like almost always), it is easy to disregard the "real world" in favor of a less likely, but certainly better, rehearsed scenario. After all just because the morning news says the US might consider military intervention somewhere in Central America or Southwest Asia, why should we spend a lot of extra time studying those little known adversaries (men, equipment, terrain, threats, etc.) when we can have more fun (with less preparation) out racing around the MOA at 300 feet, defending the Fulda Gap? As ridiculous as this seems, it happens every day, and, if we do some soul searching, we discover that many of us are more a part of the problem than the solution. I know a few pilots who claim that being highly proficient in hi-threat tactics makes low or medium threat tactics a "piece of cake." I personally disagree. Practicing hi-threat does not necessarily prepare one for low threat or vice versa. The question here is not hi-threat versus low threat; it's a question of reality. Are we emphasizing training (high or low) which best prepares us for the next probable conflict?



Checkered Flag Tasking. This ensures that units are prepared for immediate deployment to various worldwide locations. It is an important part of our national defense strategy. Unfortunately, there seems to be a feeling among some pilots that Checkered Flag tasking somehow makes them immune from fighting wars in other parts of the world. It makes me wonder how such pilots will react when they're suddenly thrust into a war different from the one they have single-mindedly practiced. How many tons of bombs will miss the target and how many aircraft will be damaged or shot down while pilots attempt to refine a set of tactics different from those routinely practiced back home? Please don't misunderstand me. I'm in no way degrading the importance of our Checkered Flag tasking; what I am saying is that Checkered Flag training must be carefully balanced against real

A FEW MORE WORDS ON "REALISM"

world contingencies and an appropriate amount of time spent on each. This balance will probably change from month-to-month and year-to-year to keep pace with the changing world.

The Inspector General (IG). The IG grades our readiness to deploy and fight a war. Everyone understands how important this grade is. Unfortunately, what the IG wants to see on a given day may not accurately reflect the current real world situation. This is understandable when one considers how rapidly the world can change. Perhaps the best way to approach an ORI is the same way you would approach any potential adversary. Assign him an appropriate priority. This could be the number one priority for a short period of time, depending on the seriousness and urgency of other real world contingencies. Study the threat (what does the IG want to see?). Practice with the appropriate intensity. When the IG steps off the plane, announce that you're *glad to see him*, then soundly defeat him with an Outstanding rating and send him back home. After that, it's "work as usual." Hopefully, this means preparing realistically for the next likely conflict.

Threats. When I look at the threats we simulate on a daily basis, I see two undesirable and unrealistic trends. First, there's a tendency to introduce too many threats and/or to give them greater than real world capabilities. Young flight leads seem particularly proficient at falling into this pitfall. Perhaps it's a need to prove themselves via task saturation each time they fly, or perhaps its due to lack of knowledge or just plain inexperience. In any case, they love to do things like pack the entire Russian hoard (and all associated weapons) into a few square miles (the target area). To avoid any moments of relaxation, they simulate an extensive air threat for the entire flight as well as strategically placing commando rangers with SA-7s along the low-altitude nav route (almost always on the friendly side of the FEBA). To ensure there are no periods of radio silence, they throw in a simulated FAC, AWACS, ASOC, or ABCCC, and I've even seen some guys throw in an F-15 CAP. All of this is done in the name of "realism." This practice is questionable at best! While it is important to enhance our personal capabilities by demanding more of ourselves each time we fly, we must not let this lull us into a belief that introducing unrealistic threats/tactics is an acceptable way of becoming better combat pilots. A second problem deals with the "timing" that threats show up in scenarios. A threat that shows up at an unrealistic time is just as bad as the nonexistent or overstated threat and promotes the same kind of negative learning. For example, one squadron I worked in would routinely schedule two-day exercises; the first day was normally low threat and the second high threat. In and of itself, this was fine. Unfortunately, day one and day two of the *exercises* became synonymous with day one and day two of the *war.* Actually, day two of the exercise was really more representative of day 60 of the war. The danger here is that without some explanation of how or why we suddenly went from

a few more words on "realism"

While it is important to enhance our personal capabilities by demanding more of ourselves each time we fly, we must not let this lull us into a belief that introducing unrealistic threats/tactics is an acceptable way of becoming better combat pilots.

There is little to be gained in confusing pilots as to what part of the war we are practicing.

low threat one day to high threat the next (i.e., strictly for training purposes in this case), our young pilots start to believe that the enemy can actually make SA-6s appear from nowhere overnight. The end result is the early introduction of unnecessary or more difficult tactics to deal with threats that couldn't realistically be present. The answer to this kind of a problem simply involves calling a spade a spade. If day two of our exercise represents something other than day two of the war, then let's say so. There is little to be gained in confusing pilots as to what part of the war we are practicing. When we jump from day one to day 60, a few words from the intelligence folks as to what transpired during the omitted 59 days would go a long way in bringing realism back into the scenario.

The Cosmic Scenario. It appears that many of us are still preoccupied with the cosmic. IPs and weapons officers seem to be the greatest inventors of cosmic tactics/scenarios and rightfully so (that's not to suggest the rest of us are immune). After all, they were selected for those jobs because they know more about tactics and have flying capabilities well beyond those of the average pilot. In addition, they have egos just like the rest of us so when tasked to lead a tough mission, they somehow feel compelled to create an entirely new set of tactics, however unfamiliar to the rest of the flight. The briefing is full of intricate diagrams to cover the most minute details of this particular "double whammy." Since the tactics are all new, the briefer is compelled to develop an entirely new vocabulary to describe the maneuvers. Everyone's line-up card is overflowing with unfamiliar information and the briefing runs overtime. It's not until someone notices the glazed look in Blue Four's eyes that we begin to comprehend the foolishness of what's happening. Unfortunately, the leader, adrenalin surging through his veins, will probably mistake this "no clue" look for an unspoken statement of "awe and respect" and then press out the door because they are already late to step for their well briefed but little understood cosmic scenario.

As I see it, cosmic scenarios/tactics can only lead to three things – all bad!

A FEW MORE WORDS ON "REALISM"

A few more words on "realism"

Those who think they can successfully conduct cosmic tactics under combat conditions are only kidding themselves.

The problem with flying around task saturated is that it leaves virtually no mental capacity for dealing with "Murphy" when he suddenly and unexpectedly enters the fight.

1. Increased Probability of Failure. Anyone who's ever been involved in a cosmic scenario knows what I'm talking about. Cosmic scenarios/tactics simply require too many things to go right. Pilots tend to forget that the "heat of combat" (getting shot at and trying to survive), by itself, will probably task saturate most of us. Those who think they can successfully conduct cosmic tactics under combat conditions are only kidding themselves. It seems to me that our time would be better spent in perfecting simple tactics which are so well ingrained that they can be executed flawlessly, and with little thought, even under harsh combat conditions.
2. Cosmic scenarios are difficult, if not impossible, to put back together once they fall apart. The factors which cause them to fail in the first place are generally the same ones that make them unsalvageable. Simple tactics, on the other hand, are much easier to salvage when, inadvertently, they go astray.
3. Cosmic scenarios increase the probability of a mishap. The real danger here is task saturation; if not for the leader who may have been thinking and planning for days, then certainly for Blue Four who probably walked in just a couple of hours before the briefing. Our class A mishaps over the last couple of years indicate that nearly ⅓ of all operator mishaps listed some form of task saturation as a factor. The problem with flying around task saturated is that it leaves virtually no mental capacity for dealing with "Murphy" when he suddenly and unexpectedly enters the fight. Flight leads must ensure that missions are constructed so that all flight members, including Blue Four, retain at least a small reserve of brain power to deal with the unexpected. Whenever a smart pilot, regardless of experience, feels himself becoming task saturated, he immediately dumps the least important thing (normally the scenario) and goes back to the basics: "aviate," navigate and communicate – in that order. Anything less is inappropriate and may lead to disaster.

Finally, I ask myself, "Who is responsible for promoting unrealistic/cosmic scenarios and tactics?" I'm afraid I don't like the answer because I implicate myself. The truth of the matter is, we all do to some extent. Some of us by inventing it and others by simply tolerating it. I suppose if those of us who tolerate it would just stop, the problem would essentially cease, but that's not as easy as it sounds. It requires flight leads to be extra critical of how they plan, brief and fly on a daily basis; IPs to be more critical of how they teach and SEFEs to take notice of how they evaluate. It also requires senior squadron and wing supervisors to be more involved as "watch dogs" of realistic training, willing to "growl" when pilots or planners cross the bounds of reality. It requires the ability to see the world military/political situation as it really is and demands our willingness to alter training as necessary. If we do anything less, our claims of being the world's greatest fighter pilots begin to lose credibility. While I can't speak for all fighter pilots, I can speak for myself. I intend to remain the world's single greatest fighter pilot (and the smartest)! Do I have any challengers out there?

With "Buddy-Care", You won't need "Self-Aid"

SMSgt Herbert E. Everett
Chief, Ground Safety
Alaskan Air Command

Self-aid and buddy-care training have been around for a long time. This training is necessary for each of us to be prepared in case a mishap occurs where someone is injured and needs first aid. But, even with that, we all lose when a mishap occurs. Let's turn that around by taking a proactive approach to daily activities in the workplace. "Buddy-care" is looking out for your fellow worker or teammate so he or she won't need "self-aid." No mishap – no self-aid required. Watching out for the other guy or gal can do a lot for mishap prevention. It's as easy as that.

I've never known anyone that was hurt or had a mishap on purpose. Have you? It's just that people allow themselves to get so involved in the task at hand that the things which cause mishaps tend to get overlooked. Through proactive buddy-care, we can point out unsafe conditions, actions and procedures, thus eliminating the mishap and the need for self-aid. The results of such teamwork will go both ways. When your buddy cares, you're the one that won't end up needing self-aid. When that happens, we all win.

DARE to CARE

Dare to care



SSgt Steve Schultz
TAC Ground Safety

An acquaintance of mine was recently enrolled in the Air Force alcohol rehabilitation program. We had the occasion one evening to talk about his progress in the program. He said, "I don't know why they're trying to change me. This is what I am; *who* I am. Why can't they just accept me for *me* and leave me alone?

Obviously he didn't understand that while his strong sense of individualism might have been impressive, we sometimes become so obsessed with our desires and self-perceived destinies that we need help from others to stay on the right track. His self-fulfilling prophecy was killing him and eventually made him undesirable for retention in the Air Force. Try as I might to make him understand that "they" were intervening only for his own good, he refused to accept anyone's help. In retrospect, I'm not sure that his supervisor was even aware of just how deeply his troubles ran. Otherwise, the supervisor surely would have seen to it that he got all of the help that he needed. I suppose I also fell down in my job as an NCO because I, one of his confidants, didn't alert his supervisor to the depth of this young man's troubles.

We in the Air Force have become more cognizant of the fact that our people can do better quality work when their minds are untroubled. The better equipped they are to handle their personal stresses, the better workers they will become, the greater their chances of returning to work safe and sound, and of having fewer mishaps. We are becoming more people-oriented and are learning to take interest in our

peoples' troubles – real and perceived. By showing genuine interest in our workers' troubles and worries we can help them to become better workers. A worker who seems obsessed with drinking himself into the ground or who is having money problems is bound to carry some effect of those problems to work with him. A supervisor or commander who is willing to lend a friendly ear and help the worker in solving the problem or getting over the trouble is bound to be respected and seen as a good leader.

You're going to be reading and hearing a lot about TAC's "We Care About You" initiative in coming months. It reinforces our "we take care of our own" philosophy and is designed to foster greater commander and supervisor interest and concern in subordinate activities off the job. The initiative was started because we realized that TAC was losing a great number of its most important resources – *its people* – each year. The majority of these people were being killed in off-duty mishaps. Mishap investigations often revealed troubles or problems that might have contributed to the mishaps but which were not known by commanders or supervisors. In several cases, supervisors and commanders were aware of such troubles or problems but failed to recognize the potential result. I'd like to tell you what the initiative means to me through some real mishaps that have occurred within our command. There are lessons to be learned from each of these mishaps, and you might see some similarities between the people involved and some of your fellow workers. You might even see where other folks fell down in their responsibilities and how you can avoid similar pitfalls.

We all appreciate a gung-ho worker who only wants to get the job done and please the boss. But that can often lead to problems. A young airman was killed when the aircraft tire he was servicing with compressed gaseous nitrogen became over-pressurized and exploded with great force. The mishap investigation board determined that the airman attempted to perform a tacitly accepted tire servicing shortcut that he had observed being done by someone else. Unfortunately, the airman was not totally familiar with exactly how to do the short-cut. It seems that the airman, described as a conscientious, eager worker, wasn't able to obtain the necessary tools to properly service the tire. His character probably dictated that he do whatever it took to please his supervisor, so he elected to attempt the shortcut. The unauthorized method left out several crucial pieces of equipment that probably would have saved the airman's life, no matter how improperly he had done the rest of the task. The point in this mishap is that we need to encourage our young people to stand up and be counted. They need to realize that they do not have the authority to continue performing a task when the necessary tools aren't available. In fact, they must let their supervisors know when necessary tools continually cannot be obtained over a period of time. Just telling workers that they need to bring such matters to your attention isn't enough. Supervisors and commanders have inherent responsibilities here as well. The supervisor must make the decision to continue the task without the required equipment or hold up the job until it can be obtained. The supervisor must then find out why the equipment is not available. Is there a sufficient quantity on-hand? Is the on-hand stock broken?

Each and every supervisor and commander has one more responsibility: they must make sure that workers feel comfortable in coming to them about such difficulties. Workers need to know they can bring problems to the boss and that they will get help. If the workers perceive that we're talking a good game but, in reality, don't follow through, we lose. It's the old problem of two-way communication and setting the example.

Commanders and supervisors also need to show they care by considering the life stress levels of their workers. Several years ago another young airman was tasked with being the spotter for a munitions handler who was moving all-up-round (AUR) containers with a forklift. After moving a stack of AURs, the forklift operator neglected to lower the tines and the spotter failed to notice that,

DARE TO CARE

because of the raised tines, the forklift upper mast assembly would no longer pass under an unused overhead crane track assembly. The mast struck the I-beam and it fell, striking the spotter who sustained permanent totally disabling injuries. Investigation of the mishap revealed, among other things, that the spotter had two stressful life experiences shortly before the mishap: he had just returned to work that morning after taking leave to attend his grandfather's funeral, and he had just purchased his first car two days before the mishap. While neither of these life stresses were listed as causes of the mishap, it makes you wonder exactly where the spotter's mind was just before the mishap. Was he distracted? Saddened by the loss of his grandfather? Elated over his new car? Certainly supervisors and commanders should be aware of their workers' mental states and abilities to perform assigned tasks. If a worker has experienced one or more life stresses and the mission will allow it, that worker should probably be assigned to light administrative tasks for a couple of days. This protects the worker and it's a good leadership decision.

Many of the Air Force personnel killed each year through mishaps give danger signals long before making their fatal mistake. We have many mishap reports on file showing clear histories of DWIs, letters of counseling, traffic citations, alcohol and drug problems, past involvement in mishaps, and disciplinary actions. It's easy to dig all of this up while investigating a mishap and to point the finger while saying the supervisor should have known. **But it's too late then!** The plain truth is nobody is in a better position to spot danger signals and take action to correct inappropriate or undesirable attitudes **before** the fatal mishap than the person's supervisor. The supervisor sees the worker almost every day, should notice any changes in the worker and will most likely be aware of any troubles in the worker's life. A worker's home life, hopes, ambitions, values, physical well-being and almost every facet of the worker's life should be of utmost concern to the supervisor. It might seem harsh to recommend enrollment in an alcohol evaluation program when you suspect an alcohol problem. But how would you feel if you, as a supervisor, let the worker slide, only to have him killed in an alcohol-related incident?

The point of all of this is simple caring. Everyone suffers and so does our ability to do the mission when a mishap occurs. Commanders and supervisors have inherent responsibilities to their workers. It's easy to care, but taking the time to make it happen takes a bit more effort. Those who do will reap both the rewards and the hardships that go along. But isn't that what success is all about?

TAC
CREW CHIEF SAFETY AWARD

Staff Sergeant Brent B. Buechler is a dedicated crew chief who epitomizes the professional TAC maintenance approach in adherence to flight line ground safety. His extensive experience on C-130 aircraft has served him well both as a superior trainer of newly assigned personnel and as a safety watchdog in his unit maintenance activities.

A good example of SSgt Buechler's thoroughness and safety consciousness occurred recently when he was performing a basic aircraft postflight inspection. During the inspection, he discovered that the main landing gear wheel assemblies were overdue nondestructive inspection. He took the problem a step further and determined that an administrative lapse had caused the unit to miss a required inspection. A subsequent fleet-wide inspection identified several other aircraft with overdue inspections. If this condition had gone undetected, the gear wheel assemblies could have failed, resulting in aircraft damage and personnel injury. SSgt Buechler discovered this problem because he went beyond the published inspection guidelines.

On another occasion, SSgt Buechler found several loose rivets in an engine intake during a preflight inspection. He immediately notified structural maintenance who corrected the problem, averting potential foreign object damage.

SSgt Buechler's continued example of professionalism and his timely, correct maintenance actions have increased his unit's mission readiness and ensured continued flight safety on valuable USAF combat aircraft.

SSgt Brent B. Buechler
41st Electronic Combat Squadron
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona

WEAPONS WORDS

Runaway step van

Ammunitions expediter and two weapons technicians headed south on taxiway one in a step van towards the dearm area to recover the third four-ship of the day. Weather, lighting and workload were nearly ideal. The expediter slowed the van to a crawl while requesting clearance from the tower to cross the active runway. Civilian air traffic was light and clearance from the tower came immediately: "Red three – cleared to cross one-five without delay."

The expediter accelerated the van heartily and was rapidly across the active runway. Once on the other side, deceleration did not occur when the driver removed his foot from the throttle. To the contrary, continued, rapid acceleration occurred; so he stepped on the brakes. But the van's engine continued to increase in rpm, overriding the brakes. The expediter moved the gear-shift lever from Drive to Neutral and continued to apply brakes. Then he shut down the engine and the van coasted into the dearm area on the pavement adjacent to the taxiway.

Several attempts to restart the van's engine resulted in uncontrollably high acceleration of the engine. So the expediter radioed maintenance control for motorpool technicians to come and look at the suspected carburetor malfunction. While awaiting their arrival, the crew completed dearming the fighters.

The culprit? The threaded portion of a sway-brace from the MER/TER ejector rack had been left on the van's engine cowling. Later it slid forward and left and lodged between the inside firewall and the accelerator linkage. Its position caused the accelerator to remain in the full open setting.

All the team members were immediately aware of "FOD in their own cockpit."

Hurry up and look out!

A weapons crew was downloading an F-15's AIM-7 Sparrow missiles during an integrated combat turnaround (ICT). As each radar-guided missile came off the Eagle, the crew placed it on the bed of the MHU-12M trailer. One of the workers, armed with a trusty Allen wrench, marched up to the trailer to remove the fins from the missiles. One of the fins was resting against the trailer's frame which made it hard to get at with the wrench. So he took the Sparrow by two fins and rolled it over. Unfortunately, it rolled right out of the chocks and fell nose first to the concrete. Out of action.

ICTs are designed to get our jets back in the air on another mission as quickly as possible. But when we're trying to hustle, we're more liable to make a mistake. If the mistake breaks the airplane or ruins the ordnance, we've defeated the purpose of the quick turn. While ICTs are indeed a time to hurry, they're also a time to be on guard.

Souvenir

Most of us collect some kind of souvenir from the places we visit, even if it's just a postcard or picture. Deployments are no exception. Who doesn't like to show off his German beer stein, Spanish porcelain or Korean tailor-made sports coat? But some souvenirs can only get us in trouble.

One fellow came back from a deployment with an unauthorized ground burst simulator (GBS) like the kind he had seen used during exercises when he was TDY. He was evidently very impressed with its powerful sound and wanted to show it to one of his buddies. After work one afternoon, he took the GBS from the trunk of his car, pulled the pin, and threw the GBS several feet away in the parking lot. It didn't go off.

Determined, he retrieved it and brought it back inside the building where he cut it in half with a hacksaw. Back outside now, he tried to light each half with his cigarette lighter. The first half only burned. But the second exploded in his face, causing serious burns to his face and hands.

To those of us who aren't trained in the use of explosives, the lesson is clear – don't. But the incident also serves to remind us to keep close tabs on explosives used to simulate airfield attacks and other mock disasters during our own exercises. Let's not be responsible for a *helper* helping him or herself to "an extra" noise maker.

Pass it along



LISTEN TO THE MICE

Major Doug Caywood
354 TFW
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC

We called him Bat. That was his tactical call sign. It's been just over a year now since he punched down through a scud deck and augered into a quaint English hillside during an exchange tour with the Brits. He'd been a number of things in our squadron – instructor pilot, weapons officer and flight commander, just to name a few. He was on the wing Gunsmoke team during the last two competitions. In a nutshell, Bat had good hands. No one could believe it when word of his crash got back to the squadron. Everyone wondered how it could have happened. I knew. You see, Bat forgot to listen to the mice.

According to Bat, the mice were instrumental in flying a good jet. With squadron mates gathered around, Bat would describe in detail how he'd crank his jet up and start the alignment that would get all the mice in that one little black box lined up and sniffing in the same direction. He'd graphically demonstrate how a good set of mice could ride out the steepest of turns, survive one of his renowned high G rollins, and, during a three second final, sniff out the winds, align the pipper track with the pylon, and magically cause the blue practice bomb to fall off at just the right moment to shack the target. Funny thing, but Bat's mice seemed to help him accomplish this feat on a regular basis without the aid of a computer bombing system.

The young guys were all in awe. They tried and tried, but none of them could get their mice as well trained as Bat's. In fact, most of the pilots began to doubt whether there were any mice at all. But I knew better. As an old head, I knew all about the mice. Oh, sure, I'd heard them called other things; sometimes referred to as "short hairs on the back of the neck" and other times as "gut feelings." Whatever they were called, I knew we all had them. Some of us just listened to the mice better than others.

That's what I think happened to Bat on that fateful day. He must have seen that hole and thought the only chance of saving the mission was to get down through it. The mice must have been hanging in there, working in unison, noses into the wind. And, as their claws began to dig in and their squeal of warning got louder and louder, Bat must have tuned them out. He wasn't listening to the mice – are you?

TAC TALLY

	Total			TAC			ANG			AFR		
	DEC	THRU DEC		DEC	THRU DEC		DEC	THRU DEC		DEC	THRU DEC	
		FY 88	FY 87		FY 88	FY 87		FY 88	FY 87		FY 88	FY 87
CLASS A MISHAPS	1	6	13	1	5	9	0	1	3	0	0	1
AIRCREW FATALITIES	0	2	6	0	2	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
* IN THE ENVELOPE EJECTIONS	1/0	5/0	13/1	1/0	4/0	7/1	0/0	1/0	5/0	0/0	0/0	1/0
* OUT OF ENVELOPE EJECTIONS	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0

* (SUCCESSFUL/UNSUCCESSFUL)

TAC'S TOP 5 thru DEC 1987

1st AF	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
88	318 FIS
35	325 TTW
23	57 FIS
23	5 FIS
2	48 FIS

9th AF	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
58	33 TFW
31	507 TAIRCW
22	31 TFW
17	354 TFW
14	347 TFW

12th AF	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
56	366 TFW
34	58 TTW
27	35 TTW
21	474 TFW
19	388 TFW

ANG	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
221	182 TASG
205	110 TASG
180	138 TFG
162	177 FIG
157	114 TFG

AFR	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
88	482 TFW
78	924 TFG
66	906 TFG
40	507 TFG
27	917 TFW

DRUs	
CLASS A MISHAP-FREE MONTHS	
135	28 AD
5	USAFTAWC
2	USAFTFWC

CLASS A MISHAP COMPARISON RATE

(CUMMULATIVE RATE BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FLYING TIME)

TAC	FY 88	6.4	3.4	2.9									
	FY 87	7.5	5.8	5.1	4.7	4.2	3.7	3.3	2.9	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.9
ANG	FY 88	0.0	2.2	1.5									
	FY 87	4.0	6.6	4.7	3.5	2.8	4.5	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.5
AFR	FY 88	0.0	0.0	0.0									
	FY 87	21.8	11.7	8.5	12.6	10.2	8.3	7.0	12.2	10.8	9.6	8.5	7.8
Total	FY 88	4.3	2.9	2.3									
	FY 87	7.3	6.3	5.2	4.8	4.1	4.1	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.0
MONTH		OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP

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Fleagle
MY FOWL FANNY CAN'T TAKE MUCH MORE OF THIS KINDA WEATHER.
I DON'T CARE WHAT TH' CONDITION IS, I'M HEADIN' HOME.
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THISDON'TLOOKSOGOOD...
GRIFF, THAT FLEAGLE COMMIN' YONDER ?
LOOKS LIKE'EM.
HARDISON
IS THAT A NATURAL GLASSY LOOK HE GOT IN HIS EYES OR ICE ?
ICE.